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Most reported cases of human monkeypox occur in 
Central and West Africa, where the causing virus is 
endemic. We describe the identification and public 
health response to an imported case of West African 
monkeypox from Nigeria to the United Kingdom (UK) 
in May 2021. Secondary transmission from the index 
case occurred within the family to another adult and 
a toddler. Concurrent COVID-19-related control meas-
ures upon arrival and at the hospital, facilitated detec-
tion and limited the number of potential contacts.
Monkeypox is a rare viral zoonotic disease. The caus-
ing virus belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus that 
includes variola virus (the cause of smallpox), vaccinia 
virus (used in the smallpox vaccine), and cowpox virus. 
There are two distinct clades of monkeypox virus—
Central African and West African. The first human cases 
were identified in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
1970 [1]. Outside of Africa, cases of human monkeypox 
infections have been documented in four countries: 
four cases the United Kingdom (UK) in 2018/2019, one 
case in Israel in 2018 and one case in Singapore in 
2019 [2], 47 cases in the United States (US) in 2003 and 
one in 2021 [3]. We report on a family cluster of three 
recent cases of monkeypox in the UK associated with 
travel from Nigeria.
Case description
In May 2021, the index case (Case 1) travelled with their 
family from Delta State, Nigeria to Manchester, UK via 
Istanbul, Turkey. They were asymptomatic while travel-
ling. In line with the UK coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
guidance, the entire family spent 10 days in isolation in 
a self-contained accommodation following their arrival 
to the UK [4].
Two days after arrival, Case 1 developed a vesicular 
lesion, with further vesicles developing over the next 
week while the entire family continued to self-isolate. 
Twelve days later, Case 1 presented at a local emergency 
department. They were reviewed in a hospital emer-
gency department’s COVID-19 zone (because of their 
recent travel history) by staff wearing personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) for the care of COVID-19 patients 
(i.e. disposable gloves, apron, eye protection, fluid 
resistant surgical mask type IIR) [5], and discharged 
the same day. However, on the day after, following dis-
cussion between the emergency department and the 
UK Imported Fever Service, Case 1 was transferred to 
a high consequence infectious diseases (HCID) Unit in 
Liverpool, England. Based on urine samples and skin 
swabs collected on that day, Public Health England’s 
Rare and Imported Pathogens Laboratory confirmed 2 
days later, by PCR and sequencing, the West African 
clade of monkeypox virus.
Concurrently, Case 1’s spouse and four young children 
were placed under active surveillance at their accom-
modation by Public Health Wales (PHW) supported 
by paediatric infectious diseases specialists. 19 days 
after Case 1 symptoms’ onset (ASO), the youngest child 
(18 months, Case 2) developed lesions compatible with 
early monkeypox; the decision was made to transfer 
the spouse and all four children to the same HCID Unit 
in Liverpool as Case 1 to enable clinical assessment 
of the family members. On day 21 ASO (day 2 after 
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symptom onset in Case 2), PCR testing of the lesion 
swabs confirmed monkeypox virus infection and the 
toddler was managed with specialist paediatric sup-
port from the regional children’s hospital in Liverpool.
Meanwhile, by day 19 ASO, Case 1 was well, afebrile, 
and all skin lesions had crusted. They tested negative 
for monkeypox virus by PCR in urine, blood, swabs 
of lesions/lesion fluid and nose/throat swab sam-
ples on two occasions, 24 h apart. The three children 
with no features clinically compatible with monkeypox 
remained with Case 1 for monitoring and remained 
asymptomatic. On day 25 APO, Case 1 was discharged 
with the three children who did not develop monkey-
pox while under active surveillance within the 21-day 
follow-up period.
On day 33 ASO of Case 1, the other adult member of the 
family (Case 3), who cared for the Case 2 and resided 
in the same isolation room for the duration of their 
hospital admission, developed a vesicular rash. On 
day 3 after symptoms onset in Case 3, PCR of a lesion 
swab confirmed monkeypox virus. On days 24 and 10 
of their respective symptom onset, Cases 2 and 3 clini-
cally recovered and were discharged after confirmation 
of viral clearance. They tested negative for monkey-
pox virus by PCR in blood samples, urine samples and 
swabs of lesions/lesion fluid and nose/throat on two 
occasions, 24 h apart.
Public health response
On notification of a probable and then confirmed case 
of monkeypox, the health authorities activated the 
incident management team and the HCID network. In 
accordance with the International Health Regulations 
(IHR) [6], information was reported to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Nigerian national IHR focal 
point. Public Health Wales identified and contacts and 
stratified them by risk level. Contacts included house-
hold contacts, healthcare workers, hospital laundry 
workers, and members of the public who may have 
been exposed. Thirty contacts in Wales were identi-
fied for active surveillance and eight for passive sur-
veillance [7]. Since Case 1 developed symptoms after 
arrival in the UK, aeroplane passengers on the incom-
ing flight were discounted from surveillance.
Passive surveillance was used for individuals identi-
fied as having a low-risk exposure to Case 1, their body 
fluids, or potentially infectious materials. Low-risk 
exposure was considered to be physical contact with 
the confirmed case while wearing PPE (i.e. dispos-
able gloves, gown and a filtering face piece FFP3 face 
mask). These individuals were provided with written 
information including phone numbers to contact PHW 
if they developed symptoms. Active surveillance was 
used for individuals identified as having an interme-
diate- or high-risk exposure to Case 1 (Cases 2 and 3 
were already in isolation before becoming infectious), 
their body fluids, or potentially infectious materials. 
Direct exposure of broken skin or mucous membranes 
to a symptomatic monkeypox case, their body fluids or 
potentially infectious material (including on clothing 
or bedding) without wearing full PPE (including FFP3 
or equivalent) was considered to constitute high-risk 
exposure. The PHW health protection team contacted 
these individuals daily throughout the 21-day follow-
up period to check for potential prodromal monkeypox 
symptoms including fever, headache, myalgia, back-
ache, lymphadenopathy, chills or exhaustion. No con-
tacts travelled outside of the UK following exposure. All 
contacts identified for active surveillance completed 
the 21-day surveillance period from their last date of 
exposure. No transmission outside the index family 
was identified.
The local authority facilitated decontamination of the 
family’s residential accommodation by a UK govern-
ment approved contractor. Post-exposure vaccination 
was not offered to contacts or the family members due 
to the level of exposure and late presentation of Case 
1 at the hospital. Healthcare workers in the HCID Unit 
were offered vaccination with modified vaccinia Ankara 
(MVA-BN/Imvanex) vaccine.
Discussion
Monkeypox was first discovered in 1958 [8]. It was 
not recognised as a human infection until 1970 dur-
ing the smallpox eradication programme [9]. The larg-
est outbreak reported outside of Africa was in the US 
where cases were found to be connected to imported 
pet rodents. More recent imported cases have all been 
associated with travel from Nigeria [2]. Since 2017, 
Nigeria has recorded its largest ongoing outbreak of 
monkeypox with a total of 446 cases and eight deaths 
[10].
The animal reservoir of monkeypox remains unknown, 
however, evidence suggests it may be rodents, includ-
ing giant Gambian rats (Cricetomys gambianus) and 
squirrels [11]. Transmission through direct or indirect 
contact with live or dead animals, including through 
bushmeat consumption, hunting, or trade, is presumed 
to be the main factor for human monkeypox infections 
[12]. Human-to-human transmission is less common but 
possible through close contact with an infected per-
son’s skin lesions, large respiratory droplets exhaled 
during extended face-to-face contact, or contaminated 
objects [2,8]. Genetic sequencing confirmed the cases 
described here as being West-African clade, which 
is less commonly associated with human-to-human 
transmission [13].
The incubation period of monkeypox is typically from 
6 to 16 days (range: 5–21) [2,9]. The symptoms, which 
are usually self-limiting, are divided into an inva-
sion (fever, lymphadenopathy, myalgia) and eruption 
phase. Monkeypox produces characteristic lesions that 
are typical of orthopoxviruses. Lymphadenopathy is a 
key feature that can help differentiate monkeypox from 
diseases with similar initial presentation (e.g. chick-
enpox, measles, smallpox) [2]. Skin eruption usually 
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starts within 1 to 3 days of onset of fever and is usu-
ally localised to the face and extremities, with mucous 
membranes, genitalia, and palms/soles also affected. 
The rash develops sequentially from macules to pap-
ules to vesicles and finally to pustules which crust, dry 
and fall off. Lesion quantity ranges from a few to many 
thousands. These dry lesion crusts present a potential 
transmission risk. Case fatality rates range from 1% to 
11% and are highest with the Central African clade and/
or younger children [14].
There is no vaccine currently licensed for use specifi-
cally against monkeypox. Observational trials have 
shown that smallpox vaccines provide up to 85% 
protection against monkeypox [2]. More people will 
become susceptible to monkeypox as the propor-
tion vaccinated against smallpox declines due to the 
removal of routine vaccination [15]. A third genera-
tion of smallpox (MVA-BN/Imvanex) vaccine has been 
approved for pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis for 
the prevention of smallpox and monkeypox and antivi-
ral drugs are being developed [2].
The detection and control of this outbreak of imported 
monkeypox was aided by concurrent COVID-19 travel 
isolation requirements and the control measures in 
the emergency department, which limited the num-
ber of potential contacts. A coordinated multiagency 
response facilitated the prolonged self-isolation of the 
family in a safe and secure manner. Successful contact 
tracing of the 38 individuals by public health teams 
ensured any potential new cases would have been 
identified, in this instance there were no new cases 
outside the household. Hospital infection, prevention 
and control measures prevented onward transmission 
to healthcare workers.
Conclusion
These and other recently imported cases reinforce the 
importance of infectious disease surveillance, includ-
ing detailed travel and activity histories, which is criti-
cal for the implementation of an appropriate public 
health response. Incident response is aided by the 
rapid activation and expertise of the HCID network, 
with prompt sharing of information with the WHO in 
accordance with the IHR. COVID-19 control measures 
limited the number of potential contacts and second-
ary transmission occurred within the family only. The 
toddler is the first paediatric case outside Africa since 
the US outbreak in 2003.
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